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BOOK REVIEW
Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policy of an InternationalLaw of Human Dignity. Myres S. McDougal,* Harold D.
Lasswell,** and Lung-Chu Chen.*** New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1980, Pp. 958. $45.00.
Reviewed by Joseph A. Gentile****
As a prelude to any review of an international law treatise, it is wise
to reiterate the unique niche the treatise has maintained in this area of
law. Due to the lack of an absolutely powerful world tribunal, precedent and authority as they exist in "regular" municipal law, remain in
short supply. The treatise writers' scholarship commonly fills this void,
and often becomes primary authority for international tribunals. Such
diverse subjects as the divorce of international law from theology and
even the law of the seas share a common origin in the humble treatise,
and through assimilation become part of the Law of Nations.
In this historical matrix, Human Rights and World Public Order
may someday be of similar importance. The Law of Nations has traditionally shown a general apathy for individuals within the territory or
jurisdiction of their own nation. With the rise of the nation-state this
doctrine of sovereignty served to prevent unwelcome intrusion into
municipal affairs, despite a lack of decent human treatment of a municipal citizen.
Myres McDougal, a native of Mississippi, joins the company of two
other notable scholars, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-Chu Chen, in
penetrating this municipal boundary with a delicate touch. The authors' collective premise is that international order protects a basic set
of human rights arising out of the universal demand for Respect, Power, Enlightenment, Well-being, Wealth, Skill, Affection and Rectitude.
Deprivations and non-fulfillment of these broadly classified rights is
per se violative of international order because the individual is a basic
element of international order. Herein lies the severe alteration in the
function of international law, equal no doubt to the rise of the nationstate; the ability of international law to, on proper occasion, set aside
the old rule that nation-to-nation relations are the only proper discussion of international jurisprudence, and look at nation-to-person relations.
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As the authors willingly point out, recent rhetoric in Washington,
D.C. and the United Nations has accented this principle in fact, if not
in theory. Such laudatory or hated concepts as the Genocide Treaty
stand as valid proof of international protectionism. Generally, as communication and the slow growth of international tribunals alter the traditional aloof nature of diplomacy from presidents to people, we are
witnessing a growth in humanitarian concern by a Sovereignty for its
own citizens. This volume is truly the first to put a sound judicial orientation to this humanitarian concern. In this sense, it is of prime impact to the municipal and international jurists due to its radical departure from the traditional staid view that a nation may do what it wills
with its own citizens.
Undoubtedly, the conceptually oriented reader will find great fascination with these ideas. Conversely, the reality oriented reader will
well wonder what bearing this will have on the portion of the world
within his or her national frontiers. In an eclectic manner, the authors
condemn the traditional liberal litany of condoned evils, i.e., racism,
torture, hunger, ignorance, slavery, etc., and substitute their own
dreams of a new humanistic world, which may provide a new mandatory substance for future transnational practice of law, even for the
municipal isolationist.
My main criticism of this volume centers around this humanistic
packet of dreams. One must note the real enemy of ideas is not other
ideas, but stark reality. The inclusive philosophy of the treatise does
not deal adequately with the hard fact that the international community is allowing a rapid growth of political and economic influence of
the ad-soaked Islamic world. Islamic thought and theocracy allow but
little space for the humanistic platitudes of western scholars who infringe on Islam's real and ancient traditions. Simplistically speaking,
no United Nations action will secure for women the right to drive in
Saudi Arabia. Our three authors persist in underestimating the jealousy
of a nation over its internal dealings, and ignore the cultural slant of
their own authorship.
As a conclusion, the volume is good reading for all those who either
practice or retain an interest in transnational activity. Human Rights
and World Public Order may be a harbinger of limited things to
come. At bare minimum, it will alert the transnational practitioner and
scholar to a prevailing, if not entirely practical trend, in the uncommon jurisprudence of international law.

